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Abstract
We introduce resource graphs, a representation of linked ideas used when reasoning about
specific contexts in physics.  Our model is consistent with previous descriptions of resources and
coordination classes.  It can represent mesoscopic scales that are neither knowledge-in-pieces or large-
scale concepts.  We use resource graphs to describe several forms of conceptual change: incremental,
cascade, wholesale, and dual construction.  For each, we give evidence from the physics education
research literature to show examples of each form of conceptual change.  Where possible, we compare
our representation to models used by other researchers.  Building on our representation, we introduce a
new form of conceptual change, differentiation, and suggest several experimental studies that would help
understand the differences between reform-based curricula.
PACS: 01.40Fk, 01.40.Ha
1.  INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we present a simple
representation of student understanding of
physics that allows us to represent many
different types of learning which have been
observed and described in the physics education
research literature.  The representation is a
resource graph, in which we represent the small-
scale ideas
1-10
 which students use in a particular
setting as linked to each other and activated by
some observation.  Our research graph
representation is consistent with a description of
coordination classes
11
 but uses the idea of causal
net and readout strategy at a much smaller,
mesoscopic scale.  Our representation builds a
bridge between a microscopic “resources” level
and the macroscopic “concepts” level of
describing student reasoning.
We have three goals in creating a useful
representation of student thinking.  First, we
believe that the resource graph representation is
efficient at describing the kinds of reasoning and
learning that we observe in our physics
education research studies.  By choosing the
appropriate scale of representation, we are better
able to model the student classroom experience.
Second, we believe that a representation which
accurately accounts for reasoning in a given
context is more likely to match the work done by
curriculum developers whose task it is to affect
student reasoning.  Working at the micro- or
macroscopic level of reasoning often does not
match the learning goals of specific instructional
materials.  Finally, and most importantly, we
find that an accurate representation lets us
account for many different descriptions of
student learning.  We build on ideas such as
phenomenological primitives,
1, 9
 facets,
3
resources,
2, 4, 5, 12, 13
 coordination classes,
9
 and
conceptual change theory
14-17
 and find common
ground with descriptions of specific student
difficulties,
18
 conceptual dynamics,
19-22
 and
certain kinds of analogical reasoning.
23
  Our
work is consistent with discussions of a
“theoretical superstructure” to guide physics
education research.
24
  Our purpose is to help in
creating a common language that is consistent
with the community’s work in research,
curriculum development, and instruction.
The paper is split into five major
sections.  In section 2, we briefly review
resources, coordination classes, and conceptual
change theory.  In section 3, we describe a
simple representation of resource graphs, give
examples of how resource graph can be used to
represent student thinking, and discuss some
shortcomings of our representation.  Section 4 is
the core of the paper.  In it, we apply the
resource graph representation to four types of
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conceptual change as defined by S. Demastes
(Southerland).
17
  Throughout this section, we
compare our work to other models of reasoning
and point out strengths and weaknesses of other
approaches to modeling student thinking in the
classroom.  In Section 5, we apply the resource
graph representation.  First, we describe one
form of analogical reasoning
23
 and show that the
resource graph representation can be applied to
more than the four types of conceptual change.
Second, we apply our representation to existing
results from the PER literature to describe a kind
of conceptual change not yet discussed in the
conceptual change theory literature.  The paper
ends in section 6 with a discussion on the role of
modeling in physics education research and a
brief summary of our results.
2.  LAYING THE
FOUNDATION FOR THE
RESOURCE GRAPH
REPRESENTATION
We aim for brevity in reviewing the
literature on resources, conceptual change
theory, and coordination classes.  We assume a
reader’s familiarity with the basic ideas of each
model of reasoning and highlight the pieces we
believe are most important.
A.  Knowledge pieces: resources
A growing body of evidence over
several decades has shown that “knowledge
pieces” are useful for modeling student
reasoning.  Pieces are small-scale knowledge
elements that can be applied productively in
many different settings.
3-10
  For example of a
knowledge piece, consider “part-for-whole,”
where a part of an object (or system) can
represent the whole of the system.
25
  This idea is
natural in the context of politics (a president or
queen represents a country), corporate culture (a
charismatic Chief Executive Officer represents a
company), and literature (as described by the
term synecdoche).  In physics, we use “part-for-
whole” when we represent the motion of an
object by the motion of its center of mass.  In
each case, our thinking is simplified by
representing a large, complicated system by only
a single part of the system: the center of mass of
an object travels a parabolic trajectory, even as
the object rotates, and so on.
1
We may model many types of thinking –
analytic, procedural, conceptual,
epistemological, etc. – as being made up of such
small-scale elements.  Several examples have
been described in the literature, including
agents,
10
 phenomenological primitives,
1, 9
 facets
of knowledge,
3
 and intuitive rules.
8
  For the
purposes of this proposal we use Hammer’s
general term resources
4
 to refer to any of these
constructs.  A classic example of a
phenomenological primitive is “closer means
stronger,” which is true for heat by a fire, but
applied incorrectly to explain summer warmth
due to the Earth’s proximity to the sun in
summer.
27
  Another example is “dying away,”
9
true for both the ring of a bell that has been
struck and the motion a sliding box after
receiving a strong push across a floor.
Resources are genetic and productive,
meaning they motivate thinking and are the
elements of thinking, as well.  To describe
thinking in terms of resources can focus our
attention on what student do in the classroom
rather than what they fail to do.  It honors their
actual thinking.  On the other hand, modeling
thinking in terms of individual resources may be
too simple an approach to describe the richness
of student reasoning.
B.  Classic, large-scale conceptual
change theory
A different approach to modeling
student learning has been suggested by
researchers starting with Posner, Strike,
Hewson, and Gertzog in 1982.
14
  They built a
model of conceptual change theory (which we
refer to as “classic” conceptual change theory)
based on Piagetian accommodation and the idea
                                                      
1
 To go into more detail than will be given in
this paper, the part-for-whole knowledge piece
can be though of as a vital relation describing
elements of a blend.  For more information, see
Ref. [26].  This paper will not discuss blends
further, though they allow for an excellent,
deeper, more detailed description of the use of
knowledge pieces in reasoning.
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of the Kuhnian paradigm shift internalized into a
single individual.  The process of choosing
between competing ideas was formalized by
considering issues of plausibility, fruitfulness,
and intelligibility of a new idea that might
replace an old idea.  An early assumption of
rational consideration of competing models was
later replaced by the possibility of the change
occurring without the thinker’s awareness.
Modifications to the classic conceptual change
model 
28
 included further (and possibly implicit)
ways of comparing between competing models
such as a refined description of the status of two
conceptions.
15
  Other discussions of conceptual
change exist
29
 and have guided research for
several decades.  New studies continue to be
published on how to apply conceptual change
theory in science
23, 30-33
 and mathematics.
34-37
Rather than summarize the history of
conceptual change theory, we will focus on
certain elements which are contained in the
terminology of conceptual change theory and in
ongoing research.  First, from the original
authors
14
 forward, there has been an idea of a
conceptual ecology in which the conceptual
change occurs, that affects what kind of change
occurs, and that provides the meaningful context
for the change.  Within this conceptual ecology,
there are many different ways of knowing and
understanding, including a person’s
epistemological stance, metacognitive beliefs,
and connections to other, similar systems.
38
Several different types of conceptual change can
occur, including conceptual extension,
conceptual exchange, and more.  We discuss
these (using slightly different terminology)
below.
C.  Coordination classes can change
One problem with classic conceptual
change theory, as discussed by diSessa and
Sherin,
11
 is the lack of clarity in defining the
thing that is actually changing in conceptual
change.  What, exactly, is a concept?  How
should one define the conceptual ecology?  The
authors propose that one type (out of many
possible types) of concept is a coordination
class consisting of readout strategies that
organize sensory information and which activate
a causal net of ideas that guide one’s thinking in
a given situation.  DiSessa and Sherin show how
“force” might be thought of as a coordination
class and give examples from one student’s
development of the concept of force to show
how much detail is necessary for a complete
description of conceptual understanding.  The
idea of coordination classes has been applied to
understand student reasoning in other areas, such
as waves
25
 and kinematics.
39
Coordination classes are a way to create
large-scale “concepts” based on a resources
perspective.  A network of resources is activated
in a setting.  For example, if an object falls
toward the ground in front of a moving car, we
may observe (read out) in particular that the
object is small, orange, and moving slowly.  It
might be only a leaf.  Reasoning resources
(perhaps “small things have small effects” and
“slow means soft”) are primed and activated
along with the readout.  A combination of
resources is coordinated (most likely
subconsciously) to create a single behavior or
result (for example, do not swerve to miss the
leaf – but swerve to miss a small, grey, quickly
falling stone).  The model of resource
coordination is consistent with what is known of
long-term memory, namely that it is associative:
activating one element “primes” other elements,
making them ready for activation.
A detailed example illustrates the small-
grain model.  In previous research,
40
 we found
that student responses to a series of seemingly
unrelated questions about mechanical waves
could be explained as if students were thinking
about physical objects, not propagating
disturbances to a system.  Students would read
out that the peak of a wavepulse was much like
the center-of-mass of an object; a readout guided
by “part-for-whole” seemed to activate a set of
ideas related to objects and a “causal net” of
associated resources was activated.  Students
would then also often talk about effects “dying
away,” such as the amplitude of an ideal wave
decaying during propagation.  These students
misinterpreted elements of the mathematical
formulation of waves to arrive at their answer.
41
When discussing superposition,
42
 students might
activate resources such as “bouncing” and
“canceling.”  Two waves traveling toward each
other would not pass through each other but
bounce off each other or part of one such wave
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might cancel another out permanently.  When
discussing propagation, students might apply
“activating agency”
4, 9
 (to quote a student, a
“force of the hand” was needed to create the
wave and get it moving, and a harder flick led to
a faster wave
42
).  When discussing sound waves
propagating through the air, students might use
“maintaining agency” (a force is required to
keep things moving, for example), refined to
include concepts of frequency and volume and
their effect on the initial force on the system.
43
Each of these resources can naturally be applied
to objects, but was applied to waves.  We
inferred the existence of an object coordination
class being applied inappropriately in the
context of waves.
25
  The language allowed us to
think of both the knowledge-in-pieces approach
(resources)
1
 and the conceptual approach
(coordination classes)
11
 and to tune our
curriculum correspondingly
43
 while remaining
consistent with a description of specific student
difficulties while learning new ideas.
40-42
The coordination class model, in
particular readout strategies and causal nets, is
similar to other models of student reasoning.
Readout strategies are akin to the term framing
used by researchers such as Tannen,
44
Goffman,
45
 and MacLachlan and Reid.
46
  A
frame is defined as the set of expectations about
how to act and what to think in a given situation.
Our discussion of readout strategies is tightly
aligned with the description of framing given by
Hammer, Redish, Elby, and Scherr.
47
  Causal
nets can be thought of in terms of semantic nets
or the types of diagrams associated with
connectionist theories.
48
  We discuss the idea of
linking resources in section III.
3.  REPRESENTING
COORDINATION CLASSES
AS RESOURCE GRAPHS
In this section, we describe a simple
representation of coordination classes that will
allow us to discuss several meaningful aspects of
the model.  Our representation is incomplete but
sufficient for our needs.  Issues such as the
structure of linking require further work.
49
  We
split our discussion into three pieces: an
introduction to network diagrams, static and
dynamic views of our diagrams, and a
discussion of the flaws in our representation.  In
section IV, we will apply our representation to
several different forms of conceptual change.
A.  Resource graphs – fractal
networks of linked resources
We represent the resources that students
use in a given setting by using a simple “circle
and line” model.  Resources (represented as
circles) are linked together (connected by lines).
We refer to our network diagrams as resource
graphs.  A simple version is shown in Figure 1.
Part-
for-
whole
Boun-
cing
Actua-
ting
Dying
away
FIG. 1:  Example resource graph.  Individual
resources are circled and connected to each other
by lines.
1.  Resources in networks
In our representation, each circle
represents a resource.  Resources, be they
conceptual, procedural, or analytical, are
represented as circles for the moment.  In our
figure, only conceptual resources are shown.
We add simple names to help distinguish
between resources.  Only those resources used in
a given situation are shown in our
representation; one can imagine many other
resources associated with objects, but our
example shows only a few.  Thus, our
representation is a context-dependent resource
graph that is at least theoretically observable.  In
the upper left of the figure, we show the
perception driven conceptual resource “part-for-
whole” which is connected to several other
conceptual resources.  The “net” of four
resources describes one way of reasoning about
a system as an object.  You can throw objects
with a certain speed, thus using an “actuating
agency” to create motion.  Objects bounce off
other objects (which affects how they move,
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linking back to “actuating agency”).  An object’s
motion dies away with time in a frictional world,
which might be described as the actuating
agency’s effect “dying away.” “Bouncing” and
“dying away” are not linked in the resource
graph because the two ideas are not used in
conjunction with each other (though both are
connected to “actuating agency,” for example).
One can imagine experiments giving
evidence of certain resources being used and
activated in relation to others.  For example, one
can interpret data from Clement
50
 to say that
students use “actuating agency” and “dying
away” to describe why a coin tossed into the air
slows down until it reaches zero velocity at the
top of its trajectory.  That the coin flips in its
motion is irrelevant; “part-for-whole” simplifies
thinking so that the center of mass motion is the
only relevant motion in the problem.  Resources
which are not observed (or whose traces cannot
be inferred in a situation) are not included in the
resource graph.  In Clement’s work, for
example, there is no discussion of bouncing
(though obviously coins bounce when they hit a
table) and the above figure would contain too
much information.
We note that our simple description of
resource graphs is consistent with DiSessa’s
criterion of span for primitives and resources.
9
The span of a resource can be defined as
whether or not it is applied in a given situation
(e.g., whether it is part of the resource graph
describing reasoning in that situation).
2.  Activation and linking
Using one resource often primes another
and makes the second more likely to be used in a
given setting.  When we observe or infer that the
second resource has been activated, we say there
is a link between the two.  Links between
resources are context dependent, consistent with
our definition of resource graphs.  We give
many examples in a later section of this paper.
When the network of linked resources is
consistently applied with strong linking between
elements, it can be used to describe the causal
net of a coordination class.  We can imagine that
one resource is first activated or used in a given
context.  Shown in Figure 2 is a typical readout
when interpreting waves as objects: students
often see the peak of a wavepulse and interpret it
as if it were a center of mass of an object.
25
Other resources are activated subsequently.  The
activation of a resource and the subsequent
linking structure can be compared to the readout
strategies of coordination classes.  Just as
readout strategies depend on the causal net of
available resources in determining how a
situation is interpreted, the set of available
resources in a resource graph influences which
might be activated first in a given situation.  For
example, if “part-for-whole” were not available
to the student at a given moment, then the
observation of a pulse’s peak would be unlikely
to activate thoughts of an object.  It is important
to note that the linking structure of a resource
graph depends on the first-activated resource.
Had another resource been activated first (say,
dying away in the figure below), a different set
of links might have existed, though the resources
in use would have stayed the same.  (The last is
by no means a necessary assumption but will not
be discussed further in the paper).
Part-
for-
whole
Boun-
cing
Actua-
ting
Dying
away
pulse
has
peak
FIG. 2:  Resource graph with activation
included.  This graph is built from data on
student reasoning about wave-pulse propagation
on a string.
3.  Multiple scales for analyzing resources
Finally, our resource graphs allow us to
consider multiple scales of analysis.  For
example, the resource “dying away” most likely
contains much substructure.  It describes a
property of an object, where the property (such
as the motion of a coin tossed in the air or the
amplitude of a wavepulse traveling along a long,
taut string) changes with time by slowly
disappearing.  Thus, objects, properties, and
time dependencies all play a role in
understanding the seemingly primitive “dying
away.”  As a result, we can say that resources
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span across several levels of complexity, as
described by Aufschnaiter and Aufschnaiter.
51
We represent this by showing sub-structure in a
resource (see Figure 3).
Dying
Away
Boun-
cing
Actua-
ting
pulse
has
peak
Part-
for-
whole
FIG. 3:  Example of the fractal nature of
resource graphs.  The resource “dying away” is
made up of sub-parts.
Several different readouts are associated
with the observation of “dying away.,”  One
needs to identify an object, look for information
which describes the relevant properties, and use
ways to see how the properties change with
time.  Such an analysis makes the resource
“dying away” similar to a coordination class.
We choose not to analyze resources at this level
within this paper, though the fractal nature of
resource graphs does suggest certain methods of
interpretation which will be used in this paper.
More details can be found in Sayre’s work.
49
In summary, resource graphs are
representations of a person’s resource use in a
given situation.  They are context dependent.
They are consistent with terms such as span,
readout strategies, and causal nets.  They can
describe the fractal nature of resources.  At a
basic level, they are consistent with the
coordination class model.
B.  Examples of the dynamics of
resource graphs
By choosing to represent resource
graphs statically, we have left out several
dynamic elements of reasoning which would
require a dynamic representation.  A movie
perspective in which elements change over time
or the path of activation can be followed might
be more illustrative.  We present two examples
of how a dynamic resource graph might give
insights into representing student reasoning.  We
leave further discussions for future research.
1.  “Knowledge as invented stuff” promotes
additional linking
In the first example, we consider
activating one epistemological resource,
“knowledge as invented stuff” 
13
.  When
students apply this resource to their thinking,
they might seek to create new ideas by
combining existing conceptual resources into
new constructs.
52
  New ideas might be created
along the way.  The new ideas might activate
previously un-primed ideas.
Representationally, activating the
“knowledge as invented stuff” epistemological
resource could have the effect of bringing more
resources into a graph and increasing the
likelihood of linking between them.  Resources
would gather on the graph and lines between
resources would be created, perhaps kept for a
while, and perhaps broken. Adding resources to
a graph and increasing links between resources
in a graph both describe student reasoning while
creating new ideas.  They are more free about
considering ideas that at first seem foreign (i.e.,
adding resources while brainstorming), and the
ideas they use are often tested against other
ideas more often (i.e., linked to other ideas more
firmly).  That spirit of attempting something
new is an observational measure of students
using “knowledge as invented stuff.”
2.  “Knowledge as remembered stuff”
suggests searching within a fixed net
In the second example, we consider
activating a different epistemological resources,
“knowledge as remembered stuff.”
13
  In such a
situation, students may be trying to remember
something they previously learned.  They are not
considering new connections between ideas, nor
are they considering building new ideas.  They
are, instead, moving in a resource graph using
existing linking structure, seeking an answer.
For example, Tuminaro provides examples of
recursive plug-and-chug epistemic games.
53
Often, such a method is appropriate and
efficient.  There are times, though, where the
recursive plug-and-chug is inappropriate and
new ideas are necessary in a way that the
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unchanging resource graph does not describe.
C.  Flaws in the representation
We have created a purposefully simple
and easy representation of resource graphs.  The
reader may have raised many objections to the
representation, two of which we wish to discuss
before applying our representation to existing
models of conceptual change and descriptions of
learning in reform-based curricula.  Many other
objections can be raised to our representation,
including the previously described static nature
of the resource graphs.
1.  Inadequate description of linking
between resources
Our representation is unclear in showing
whether a resource in a resource graph is
actually used to reason in a context or whether it
is primed for use but not yet activated.  Using
simple lines as links does not convey this
information.  Lines simply describe a connection
between two resources.
Observation of resource linking is an
experimental issue not discussed in this paper.
From an observational standpoint, there is no
difference between priming and activation; if
resource use is not observed or inferred, then we
have no evidence of it being primed, either.  To
address this limitation, we will assume that the
resources graphs we draw are ideal graphs in
which evidence for linking could be found in the
correct experimental situations.
The links we show are drawn without
blocks, stops, promotions, or other typical
constructs of connectionist models.
48
  Since the
existing representation is sufficient to our needs
of representing existing descriptions of
conceptual change, we will not describe more
complex link structures in this paper.  Defining
links (and finding appropriate observational
tools to define them) is a major area of research
when discussing causal nets and readout
strategies.
2.  Reconciliation and discrimination are
not shown
The terms reconciliation and
discrimination refer to two ways in which
resources come to be seen as part of a
coordination class.
11
  We will not address these
issues in this paper, nor does the representation
include information about them.  Instead, we
will assume that the resources and links which
are added to, deleted from, or modified when
discussing resource graphs can be
experimentally determined.  Where possible, we
will use existing literature to justify our claims,
even when the original intent of the authors was
not to give a resource-based description of
student reasoning.
4.  DESCRIBING
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
USING RESOURCE GRAPHS
As stated above, several conceptual
change theories have been proposed and
discussed.  We wish to express the process of
change by looking at coordination classes and
considering the changes that might be occurring
to the coordination classes.  We use our
representation of resource graphs to represent
the process of resource refinement,
rearrangement, and restructuring which occurs
in conceptual change.
To illustrate the applicability of our
approach, we describe four types of conceptual
change taken from Demastes:
17
 incremental,
cascade, wholesale,  and dual construction.  We
describe two of these, incremental and cascade,
as processes and two, wholesale and dual
construction, as descriptions of states.  For each
of the four, we provide an example of the
conceptual change from the existing physics
education research literature.  Where possible,
we complement these examples with
observations from our own teaching.  We note
that we do not rigorously show the existence of
individual resources in these stories.  Instead, we
refer to existing descriptions of resources in the
literature, and rely on plausible arguments at
other times.
After applying resource graphs to
describe the four types of conceptual change
presented by Demastes, we apply our
representation to two new areas.  First, we
describe one type of analogical reasoning in
terms of the four first introduced by Demastes.
We suggest that similar resource graphs allow
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for comparisons between similar situations.
Second, we apply our representation to existing
results from the PER literature to describe a new
kind of conceptual change, distinguishing.  In
this form of conceptual change, a single resource
graph (such as one connected to the idea of
motion) is split in two as people learn to
distinguish between velocity and acceleration.
A.  Incremental change as a process
1.  Representation
A common mechanism for learning is
incremental change, in which a resource graph
has resources added or deleted.  The original
resource graph on the left is modified in some
fashion to have one new resource added to it, as
shown in Figure 4.  Adding a resource to a graph
(meaning, linking this resource to others in a
given context) requires that the span of the
resource be increased to include the new
situation.  Other options might be creating a new
link between resources, deleting a resource, or
removing a link between resources.  To delete a
resource from a graph (i.e., to change the causal
net of an activated coordination class by
removing an idea) requires that the span of a
resource be changed such that it is no longer
aligned with the situation.  Incremental
conceptual change is similar to Piagetian
assimilation.  Existing ideas remain, and new
ideas are incorporated into the existing structure.
On purpose, we have left out several
elements of our resource graph representations
in our figure.  We do not indicate the activation
of the resource graph (equivalent to the readout
strategy used to call up a causal net) because it is
not important to this description.  Also, we show
only one form of incremental change.  Other
forms can easily be represented in similar
figures.
We will use the representation of
conceptual change, as shown above, in future
examples.  In this representation, “one concept”
(on the left) is represented by a resource graph.
It undergoes a change (represented by the arrow)
so that at a later time it looks different in some
specific fashion (as shown on the right).
2.  Example from PER:  Studying light from
bulbs and shadows of masks
Incremental conceptual change is
common in traditional and reform-based
instruction.  The University of Washington
(UW) Tutorials in Introductory Physics
54
activity on light and shadow,
55
 for example,
requires two incremental changes of students
learning the material (see Figure 5).  These
incremental changes are isolated and do not
depend on each other.
Students typically enter the activities
with three ideas associated with the results of
holding a mask in front of a bulb: light travels in
straight lines, light travels out in all directions
from a point source, and a mask that blocks light
acts to create an inverted image of the light
source.
56-58
  In addition to difficulties in
sketching the light coming through irregularly
shaped masks, students are typically unable to
answer questions about extended bulbs.
55
The UW Tutorial on Light and Shadow
first helps students strengthen their use of “light
in a straight line” and “out in all directions.”
They sketch what is seen on a screen in the
context of a simple point light source and a
simple, symmetric mask hole and typically do
very well.
One resource graph… … has a resource added
FIG. 4:  Incremental change.  A resource graph has a resource added (or taken away, not represented)
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In
straight
line
In all
direc-
tions
Mask
inverts
image
Typical beginning
resource graph…
In
straight
line
In all
direc-
tions
…after a first
incremental change…
…after a second
incremental change.
In
straight
line
In all
direc-
tions
Adding
effects
FIG. 5:  Incremental change in studying light and shadow.
Two incremental changes occur, both deletion and addition
A first incremental change (of
subtraction) is induced when students work
through activities which prevent the use of
“masks invert images” by considering
irregularly shaped masks with light from point
sources.  When the image on the screen is not
inverted, students must consider their model and
perhaps decrease the span of “masks invert
images” so that it no longer applies in this
situation.
A second incremental change (of
addition) occurs when “adding” is included in
the resource network.  Students must recognize
that light travels out in all directions from each
point on an extended source.  They work with a
long filament bulb and model it as a series of
individual point sources.  Each so-called point
source creates its own shape on the screen
behind the mask, and the sum of all effects is
what we actually see.  Thus, the “adding” (or
superposition) resource is in play.
9, 59
  To
activate “adding” is an incremental change to
their existing network of resources.
In real-life instruction, both these
incremental changes are often extremely
difficult to carry out.  Even when helping
students explicitly develop the model of a long
filament light bulb as a series of several small
point-like light sources, we have found many
students have a great difficulty incorporating the
idea of “adding” in their reasoning.
Evidence for the disconnected nature of
incremental changes comes from a recent
examination in a recently taught course (using
materials slightly modified from the original
UW materials) at the University of Maine.  We
found that some students did not stop using
“masks invert” and did not use “adding effects”
in their responses.  More importantly, some used
both, in that they inverted the image due to the
single point source and then added the effects
due to each point source on an extended bulb
(see Figure 6).  Our finding supports the idea
that incremental changes in resource graphs can
be addition or subtraction from networks and
that a series of incremental changes may be
independent of each other.
Mask
inverts
image
In
straight
line
In all
direc-
tions
Adding
effects
FIG. 6:  Resource graph for incorrect response.
This student did not delete one resource but
added another.
3.  Other perspectives for describing
incremental change
Other perspectives can be used to
describe incremental changes, as well.  From a
Piagetian perspective,
60
 a process of assimilation
has occurred.  The resource of “inversion” has
been subtracted without causing major changes
to the remaining ideas.  The resource of
“adding” has been assimilated into a larger
structure, again without changing the existing
ideas drastically.
From a resource perspective,
9
 we see
that the span of the “adding” resource has been
expanded to include situations dealing with light
and shadow.  The resource is now aligned with
this situation.  Such a description is consistent
with the description of conceptual change, but
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does not include a discussion of the ideas to
which the resource gets linked.
Finally, from a classical conceptual
change perspective,
14
 we see that the idea of
“inversion” has been found implausible
(contradicting observations), while the idea of
“adding” has been found fruitful, plausible, and
intelligible.  Classic conceptual change theory is
an incomplete description because it does not
fully recognize the ideas that remain in play and
how they are part of a larger network of
reasoning.  Also, it does not account for those
students who keep “inversion” while also using
“adding.”
B.  Cascade change as a process
Where a series of incremental changes
can occur in isolated steps, it is also possible to
have a series of incremental changes (addition or
subtractions of resources from a network) occur
in a connected fashion.  These might be set off
by a single change causing a cascade of further,
connected changes (one can make an analogy to
crystallization within a solution).
Though the term cascade change implies
a quick series of events, it is impossible to know
the speed with which they occurred.  One might
observe a student in the process of changing
saying, “Oh! I thought it was X but now I see
that it’s Y, which means Z, as well. That’s
neat!”  (We have observed such moments in a
classroom, for example.)  One could think of
such an observation as evidence of building or
restructuring a resource graph on-the-fly.  But,
cascade changes may occur in many other ways
and need not be on-the-fly.  One can imagine a
slower, more methodical process of connected
changes to a resource graph, in contrast to
disconnected incremental changes.
1.  Representation
At least two different types of cascade
are possible, readout-cascade and network-
cascade.
Readout-cascade.  In the first, readouts
that once activated a network or resources in a
given setting get remapped to a new network
through a surprising and far-reaching event.  The
effect can be called a ‘cascade’ in that it consists
of a series of connected incremental changes,
each dependent on the previous change.  A
readout-cascade is difficult to represent
accurately in only two static resource graphs.  In
Figure 7, the shift is indicated by having the
same activation now call up a new resource
graph.  The resources depicted in the graph on
the right were not necessarily linked before the
cascade change occurred (as represented by the
new geometry of the system).  A student might
say, “Oh, if that’s the case, then this other thing
might also be true.  Doesn’t that mean that this
third thing also occurs?”  The full set of
connected changes can be referred to as a
cascade change.
Network-cascade.  In a network-
cascade, a resource within a network is changed
in such a way as to create a cascading effect
within the network as resources are dropped or
added and new links are created between the
resources.  Again, the cascading changes are
connected and dependent on one another.  A
single readout remains, but the core concept has
activate
An activation calling up a
resource graph is transformed into
the same activation calling up
an entirely new (constructed in
connected fashion) resource graph
activate
FIG. 7:  Readout-cascade change.  The same activation leads to a new set of linked resources.
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changed.
17
  In Figure 8, the activation and some
of the resources (shaded grey on the right)
remain the same while a cascade happens as one
resource is suddenly connected to a whole set of
new ideas.  Again, the issue of on-the-fly
construction cannot be addressed in the
representation, though experimentally it might
be observable.  The resources that students use
in their thinking would show up as new white
circles in the right figure, but the time scale of
how quickly students add them to their revised
network of reasoning in a given situation cannot
be represented.
2.  Example from PER
Cascade changes have been described in
many physics education research settings.  We
have observed events (and have seen many
presentations of similar events during talks at
national American Association of Physics
Teachers meetings) in which students struggle
with an idea until suddenly an insight lets
everything fall into place suddenly.  We can
paraphrase a typical student saying, “oh, I was
thinking about it this way, but you want me to
think about it this other way.”  At that point, a
cascade of new ideas occurs as the student
reasons about a situation and builds a new
network of ideas.
Elby and Hammer 
13
 provide an example
of readout-cascade change.  By changing the
readout of a situation, students can go through a
cascade change which eventually leads to a
cognitive conflict.  Students are asked to reason
about a collision between a truck and car.  They
quickly read out that two resources (“actuating
agency” and “compensation”) are in play.
“Actuating agency” describes the effect of the
truck colliding with the car and putting the car in
motion.  “Compensation” describes the response
of the car to the collision; a heavier truck causes
more effect.  Students are first asked to apply
these resources in the context of force.
Compensation mediates actuating agency:
students typically predict that the car feels twice
the force that it exerts on the truck.  Then,
students are asked to connect the same two
resources explicitly to changes in motion.  Here,
a cascade change occurs for those students who
have not already connected “actuating agency”
and “compensation” to acceleration.  After
reading out of the situation that “actuating
agency” and “compensation” can be connected
to changes in velocity, students can quickly and
easily connect to ideas such as acceleration and
Newton’s Second Law, F = ma and the Ohm’s
p-prim (in the context of F = ma).
9
  Below, we
describe as a dual construction what occurs
afterward, when there are two different resource
graphs which describe student reasoning in a
given situation.  The ensuing cognitive conflict
can be used for teaching purposes.
Many other kinds of cascade changes
occur in our teaching.  A typical instructor tries
to build a series of connected additions and
subtractions to resource graphs and is typically
unhappy when students make unconnected
incremental changes to their thinking.  We have
often heard students go through a series of
connected changes during moments of
facilitation in small group learning
environments.  First one idea changes (either the
activate
An activation calling up a
resource graph is transformed into
the same activation calling up
a partially new (constructed in
connected fashion) resource graph
activate
FIG. 8:  Network-cascade change.  A change within a network leads to a series of connected changes.
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readout or a piece of a network in a resource
graph); then, another idea gets evaluated and
either changed, dropped, or incorporated;
additional ideas get questioned more deeply,
causing further changes; so on.  Eventually, be it
slowly over weeks or in the few minutes during
which facilitation occurs, a whole new construct
has emerged within the student’s thinking.
3.  Other perspectives for describing
cascade change
Because cascade changes consist of
additions and subtractions to resource graphs,
the same perspectives that described incremental
changes can be applied here.  But, the same
shortcomings listed above apply here, while the
resource graph representation allows for a series
of connected (cascade) or disconnected
(incremental) additions and subtractions in ways
that the other perspectives do not include.
One difficulty in comparing cascade
change to other forms of conceptual change is
that evidence of its existence relies on
observations of connected changes.  The
observational task is substantial, and even the
most detailed longitudinal study might not
contain enough information.  It is highly
possible that many changes in students’
reasoning about physics contexts are cascade
changes which we do not observe.  Even in
small group work in a typical reformed
curriculum, most students at a table are quiet.
Thus, their learning cannot be observed using
classroom video.  In interviews, we may have
more robust data, but people rarely publish
entire interview transcripts and have not
highlighted moments of cascade change in their
presentations or publications.
C.  Wholesale change to describe
states of graphs
Incremental and cascade changes
describe processes which lead to a change in a
resource graph.  Others are also possible; we
describe one, differentiation, below.  We can
also use resource graphs to describe different
states of student reasoning without knowing the
processes that led to the changes.  Wholesale
changes describe the changes from one resource
graph to another over the course of time.  The
change may occur through incremental, cascade,
or other as yet undefined processes.
1.  Representation
When studying learning using pre- and
post-instruction surveys, wholesale change can
be observed for students who have moved from
a common misconception to a correct expert
model during instruction.  In wholesale change,
the final resource graph describing reasoning
about a situation is wholly different from the
original resource graph.  Changes can occur with
regard to readouts, the resources included in the
graph, and the linking structure connecting the
resources.  Many wholesale changes can be
shown, with the basic idea that the pre- and post-
instruction resource graph look very different.
Interim steps need not be observed.
To provide one example of a wholesale
change, we represent students’ resources being
completely broken apart and unlinked only to be
rebuilt in a new network.  New ideas may be
incorporated into an existing structure.  Wholly
new sets of readouts and reasoning resources
may come into play.  A period of profound
confusion may exist in the interim (and only the
most motivated students may persist in their
studies along the way).  This period of confusion
is not necessary, but can be included in the
representation to illustrate that intermediate
steps are possible.
Figure 9 shows our process of wholesale
conceptual change, including a possible period
of profound confusion.  A single resource graph
is somehow transformed (through cognitive
conflict or other processes) into a set of
disconnected resources.  Perhaps a student is
“flailing about,” trying to find the right idea, but
the previous way of thinking about a situation no
longer holds.  Eventually, though, a new set of
resources is built, with new linking structures.
Some previous resources may still be useful in
this new resource graph, while others may have
been added to the network.  For the sake of
representational simplicity, we are not including
activations, but it is highly likely that a changed
network would lead to changed readout
strategies.
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a single
resource graph is transformed into which then builds into
a set of lightly
connected
resources
a new
resource graph
FIG. 9:  Wholesale change represented in stages.  At a later time, the resource graph describing a situation
is entirely different from the original resource graph.
2.  Example from PER
Examples of wholesale change can be
found in the literature in situations where
students move from one way of understanding
the world to another, while keeping none of their
original conception intact.  One should not
confuse a class’s movement from 10% correct to
90% correct on a question as indicative of a
wholesale change, since the model describes an
individual’s reasoning and not a class’s
collective behavior.  Instead, one might
characterize an individual student’s responses to
a well designed survey and characterize their
understanding before and after instruction.  For
example, a student could move from an impetus
model (where a coin tossed in the air “loses
force” on its way up, as described previously in
Clement’s work
50
) to a Newtonian model on
many questions of a survey such as the Force
and Motion Concept Evaluation
61
  Reif discusses
such a change in terms of a transform matrix,
62
where there is a transformation of the student
from naïve to expert learner.  Bao and
collaborators take a different approach, where
they look for consistent models of reasoning
before and after instruction rather than study
student gains in correct responses.
63, 64
It is possible to observe wholesale
change in rare instances where one is observing
students during the process.  Such studies
typically include sufficient interview evidence to
characterize student reasoning before and after
the moment of conceptual change.  The example
we present comes from work by Scherr, Vokos,
Shaffer, and collaborators at the University of
Washington.  They could reliably create
wholesale conceptual change in a surprisingly
short time-scale when carrying out interviews on
the topic of simultaneity in special relativity.
65, 66
In a typical interview task (described in full in
their papers), two volcanoes erupt
simultaneously in the reference frame of an
observer on the ground.  A spacecraft is flying
with relativistic velocity from one volcano to the
other.  At the moment of eruption, it is directly
over one volcano.  Events 1 and 2 are defined as
the eruptions of volcanoes 1 and 2, respectively.
Students must decide whether event 1 happens
before, after, or at the same time as event 2 for
observers on the ground and in the spaceship.
Scherr characterizes student reasoning
66
 as made
up of several knowledge pieces, including
“visual reality” and “ultimate reality.”  Two
instances of “visual reality” are found in student
interviews.  First, every observer has their own
reference frame.  Second, events are
simultaneous if an observer receives light from
the events at the same time.  Scherr summarizes
both these as “what you see is what there is.”
One of the many reasons why special relativity
is counter-intuitive is that it violates the
seemingly universal idea of “visual reality.”
Visual illusions may be surprising and amusing
for the same reason.  Students define “ultimate
reality” in the simultaneity of events by
believing that “things ‘really happen’ in only
one way.”  This attitude may be correct for
certain situations (rain falls downward) but not
in others (many witnesses to a crime scene or
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accident scene may tell varied stories).
In Scherr’s research, students often
began the interview task by applying “visual
reality” and “ultimate reality” in their answers.
Thus, an observer on the ground equidistant
from the volcanoes saw events 1 and 2 as
simultaneous, but an observer standing at the
foot of one and able to correct for light travel
time would state that the events were not
simultaneous.  Through a precise set of
interview questions (later turned into
instructional materials), researchers were able to
create a cognitive conflict in students.  Students
were confronted with a situation in which their
use of “visual reality” or “ultimate reality” led to
impossible situations.  One could say that the
resource graph describing a student’s initial
knowledge state fell apart.  Scherr reports
66
 that
students experienced denial, withdrawal, or
reached toward absurdist responses during the
period of confusion.  But, after a short while,
they began to build a more accurate model of the
situation in which appropriate ideas about
simultaneity are used.  Data suggest that the
change from a single intervention is lasting and
that students do not return to applying the ideas
of “visual reality” or “ultimate reality” in similar
contexts.
3.  Other perspectives for describing
wholesale change
Because of its prevalence as the
measurable outcome of instruction, wholesale
change is well studied and modeled.  We discuss
only three perspectives, though there are many
more, including the process of model analysis
mentioned above.
63, 64
First is classic conceptual change
theory
14, 15
 in which Piagetian accommodation
and aspects of Kuhnian paradigm shifts
67
 are
used to model changes in student reasoning.
Because classic conceptual change theory
includes the idea of Piagetian accommodation,
60
we address both at once.  Instructors and
researchers speak of replacing conceptions,
consistent with the idea that the old resource
graph no longer applies and a new resource
graph is better able to describe reasoning in a
situation.  Where the original conceptual change
theory includes a discussion of plausibility,
fruitfulness, and intelligibility as a guide for
determining what caused the one concept to be
favored over another, the resource graph
representation of wholesale change makes no
claims about what causes the change in student
reasoning.  Many processes and causes for
change are possible and need not be defined.
Our representation implies that changes are
driven by differences in activations caused by
new readout strategies or modifications to the
network of linked resources.  In contrast, the
Piagetian and classic conceptual change theories
describe changes at a larger, concept level
without going into detail about which elements
of the concept change and which remain useful
in a setting.
Another perspective which can be used
to describe student reasoning is one of
“overcoming a difficulty.”
18
  In keeping with the
example from relativity, Scherr and her
collaborators use the language of student
difficulties when discussing the role of
instruction on addressing certain aspects of
student reasoning.
65
  Students who have great
difficulty with certain concepts permanently
change their thinking in ways which can be
consistently and repeatedly measured.  But, as
Scherr points out,
66
 not all changes are lasting,
and student reasoning must also be described in
terms of changes to the individual resources and
not just the whole network of ideas.  Thus, the
model of “overcoming a difficulty” does not
completely describe student learning during
wholesale change.
Finally, a process of wholesale change
can occur when deciding between two models
which are used to reason in a situation.  We
discuss such “dual constructions” below.  For
the moment, we can say there may be a period
when one construction is useful to the student,
but students learning a new idea come to value
the second more than the first in the long run.  A
long time after the learning process has been
completed, the change will seem like a
wholesale change, even though the mechanisms
involved were far more complicated.  A process
described by conceptual dynamics
19-22
 can seem
like wholesale change.  At a long enough time
scale, the original idea no longer holds and has
been replaced by a new idea.
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D.  Dual construction to describe
states of graphs
In wholesale change, two different
resource graphs exist to describe a single
situation, but the graphs are separated in time.
In contrast, it is possible to have two resource
graphs to describe a single situation at the same
time.  For example, students might construct an
idea in the classroom while reasonably holding
on to the resource graph that they have used
previously (and successfully) in their everyday
life.  Perhaps the most common form of
conceptual change described in the physics
education research literature is a process of
eliciting dual constructions and creating
cognitive conflict between them.  We give two
examples of dual constructions.  One is an
induced dual construction, where a second
resource graph is elicited from students in
addition to the first resource graph which they
more readily use.  Such a process implies
building-on-the-fly, consistent with the idea of
“building with,” as described in the RBC
(recognize, build with, and construct) model.
68
The other is a readout-based dual construction,
where a student’s readout of a situation
determines which network is activated.  A
readout-based dual construction implies the
existence of more fundamental, well formed,
and lasting constructions.
1.  Representation
The representation of dual constructions
does not distinguish between induced and
readout-based dual constructions.  We will give
an example in which identical readouts (for
example, “which way does the object move?”)
with only minor variations (“am I in a physics
classroom or not?”) lead to drastically different
responses.  A classic question we have been
asked during a quiz can be paraphrased as “do
you want me to say what I think or what you
taught me?”  (Others have told similar stories,
see ref. [69, 70].)  A student asking such a
question can apply (at least) two models to a
single situation.
We represent the creation of multiple
resource graphs in the figure below.  A
development is shown where a single network
(activated in some fashion whose details are not
important at the moment) changes such that the
same activation now calls up two different,
equally available and equally viable resource
graphs.  For pictorial simplicity, we do not show
that these networks share elements, though in
reality they may share many elements.  In the
case of the classroom question about motion
described above, the activation may be a simple
physics question.  The one network might be the
everyday language a student brings to the
classroom and the other might be the physics
language learned during the course.  In general,
the dually activated resource graphs have no
inherent rightness or wrongness associated with
them.  Where in one class we wish students to
apply more formal descriptions of a situation
and not apply their colloquial language (each
represented by a different resource graph), other
situations such as wave-particle duality require
correct and at times contradictory dual
constructions.  An example of necessary dual
constructions can also be found in the
application of band structure and Drude (semi-
classical electron) models of conductivity.
71
activate Activate
A single resource graph, called
up by an some activation is transformed into
a situation where two resource
graphs are activated
FIG. 10:  Dual construction change.  In a single situation, one is able to reason clearly using two different
resource graphs.
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2.  Examples from PER
We illustrate the richness and
prevalence of dual construction conceptual
change by giving two examples from the PER
literature.  The first, in which two models of
work are presented to students and they must
learn to choose which is important, comes from
the UW Tutorials in Introductory Physics.
54
  The
second, in which both force and acceleration are
triggered when considering a collision between
objects, comes from the University of Maryland
Learning How to Learn project
13, 72
 and has
already been described above as showing
evidence of a cascade change.
Readout-induced dual constructions.
While studying student understanding of the
work-energy and impulse-momentum
theorems,
73, 74
 researchers at UW created
situations involving different mass objects
pushed by constant (and identical) forces across
essentially frictionless surfaces.  In such a
situation, applying KE = 1/2 mv
2
 and p = mv to
understand changes in kinetic energy and
momentum, respectively, lead to inconsistent
responses, while applying !KE = F!x and
!p = F!t gives consistently correct answers.
In interviews and on written responses,
students typically spoke or wrote in terms of
velocities and masses.  The readout of the
situation (observing masses moving) reasonably
led to mass and motion-based reasoning.  To
arrive at the desired comparisons, students
typically carried out compensation arguments:
the larger mass accelerates less, but for a longer
time, so it has the same kinetic energy than the
smaller mass in the end.  The same
compensation argument might lead to the
conclusion that the final momenta are also the
same.  Both answers cannot be true.
A different readout of the situation was
available to students, if they noted that the force
exerted on the masses and the distances they
traveled were the same.  In interviews, students
who did not think of this readout of the situation
were explicitly reminded of it.
What we see is that students can use two
arguments to consider changes in kinetic energy,
one based on a readout of masses and motion,
one based on a readout of forces and distance.
Given certain assumptions, answers might seem
identical for students.  But, when considering
additional evidence (or a different quantity), the
dual construction leads to conflict.  From this,
researchers and curriculum developers at the
University of Washington created instructional
materials
54
 shown to be successful in helping
students learn the physics.
74
  Based on the
resource graph representation, it is clear that the
issue is not whether students can reason with
force, distance, and time, but whether they
activate that network of ideas over another,
possibly more compelling network (perhaps
because it involves changing quantities that are
more visually compelling
75
).
A need to refine raw intuitions.  The
Newton’s Third Law tutorial by  Elby and
Hammer has been described above as containing
a cascade change in which students apply two
resources to the context of velocity change and
then reason through several steps to arrive at
conclusions about acceleration and the force that
two objects exert on each other.
13
  Prior to this,
students have also applied the same two
resources in the context of force.  When asked to
compare the forces a car and a truck exert on
each other, students, even those who might
know the right answer, will say “well, of course
you would think it’s going to be the truck.”  A
dual construction has been induced in the
students.  One situation calls us two different
resource graphs (though they share two
resources, “actuating agency” and
“compensation”) which lead to conflicting
descriptions of the forces a car and truck exert
on each other.  Discussing the conflict forms the
core of Elby’s instructional materials.  As
described by Elby and Hammer, the students are
applying an intuition of  “feels more effect” in
two different settings, acceleration and force.
The cognitive conflict that is created comes from
a dual construction induced by a cascade change
effected in the students; the authors actively help
the students build two different networks of
ideas that cannot both be true.
3.  Other perspectives for describing dual
constructions
Many other perspectives have been used
to describe dual constructions, including classic
conceptual change theory, hybrid and mixed
Using resource graphs to represent conceptual change p. 17 of 27
state mental models, conceptual dynamics, and
situated cognition.
In classic conceptual change theory,
14
researchers discuss a student’s shift from one
conception to another.  There is little discussion
of how the two conceptions came to be, but
there are several criteria that determine the status
of one conception compared to another.  A new
idea must be intelligible, fruitful, and plausible.
In our language, a resource graph must be
created for this new idea, and the results of
thinking using the ideas contained in the
resource graph should be valuable to the student.
We believe that there is rarely sufficient
evidence to describe a student’s conception.
Instead, we believe that a smaller scale
construction of several resources more
accurately reflects student reasoning about
competing ideas.
Some researchers describe students who
“have” two different theories when answering a
set of questions.  Hrepic describes hybrid states
of mental models.
76
  Students are considered to
have multiple complete and robust models of a
situation, and these compete with each other in a
given situation, so that only one or the other is
used on a given question.  Bao and Redish
discuss a similar situation in terms of mixed
mental model states.
63
  The data discussed by
these researchers show that students construct
different resource networks for a given situation.
We do not believe it is appropriate to make
claims about students’ conceptions when dealing
with individual questions, and believe a model
based on networks of resources more accurately
describes our observations of the fluidity of
student reasoning.  It may be that the description
of hybrid and mixed mental models in students’
minds is an artifact arising from comparisons
between students responses and experts’
formulations of models which are consistent
with, but far more detailed than, what students
say.
One can speak of the conceptual
dynamics,
19, 20
 for example when there is a
transition from an “old” to a “new” point of
view when studying kinematics.
21, 22
  As with
hybrid models, there is both an assumption of
information for which there might not be
evidence and a disconnect between the fluid
reasoning we observe in many of our students
and the robust nature of the “points of view” or
“concepts” whose changes are being studied.
Finally, one can think of situated
cognition
77
 as a way to describe what happens
with student reasoning as they construct
multiple, situation- and context-dependent ways
of thinking about a situation.  Though consistent
with the large-scale readout of “in a physics
classroom” or “in the non-classroom world,”
situated cognition does not provide an
explanation sufficiently detailed to account for
the subtle ways in which readouts of mass and
motion are chosen over readouts of force and
distance in the work-energy theorem example
given above.  In light of the subtleties of
reasoning evident in many physics education
research studies, the dual construction resource
graph provides a better match to data gathered in
the classroom.
E.  The value of resource graphs in
applying conceptual change
Our goal in this section has been to
illustrate the value of choosing appropriate
models in physics education research.  One’s
choice of representation can play a profound role
in guiding our research, instruction, and
curriculum development.  We argue that most
researchers implicitly use a “mescoscopic”
model of student thinking, somewhere between
individual, fleeting resource activation and the
replacement of robust, large-scale concepts.  We
believe that our language must be brought into
better alignment with the work that we do.  After
describing two forms of conceptual change
using the resource graph representation, we
suggest experimental work which is required to
better understand the process of learning in the
various reform-based curricula.
The mesoscopic scale allows us to be
more consistent with the kinds of activities we
see in students and in researchers studying
students.  None of the four types of conceptual
change described above actually involved
“concepts,” in the sense of large-scale, robust,
coherent structures of student reasoning.
DiSessa and Sherin state that  coordination
classes are one possible kind of concept.  The
data they use 
11
 to prove the existence of a
coordination class (in their case, “force”) is very
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detailed.  Most studies in PER are not as careful
and complete.  From the (mis)conceptions
perspective, researchers rarely present the data
required to convincingly show that students have
learned a concept (or that one concept has
replaced another).  From the resources
perspective, one can discuss whether individual
resources are used appropriately or not in a
given setting, but researchers are aware that
reasoning is far more complex than whether an
individual idea is turned on or off in binary
fashion.  The mesoscopic resource graph
representation of coordinated sets of ideas
allows for evidence-driven discussion of
complex student reasoning.
A mesoscopic model should take on
characteristics of both micro- and macroscopic
systems.  We believe that the resource graph
representation can be used to show the large
space of reasoning in which ideas are neither
fluidly, fleetingly held (as resources often are)
nor robust and permanently stored (as concepts
are).  Most student learning occurs where ideas
are neither.  Students are learning new ideas,
incorporating them into their thinking, breaking
apart connections and rebuilding them in new
ways, compiling ideas into new structures, and
taking these compiled structures into new
situations.  They are constantly evaluating (or
being evaluated) on what they are learning,
struggling to build whole new networks, and
often struggling to understand the kinds of
networks which we use in physics.
The four different types of conceptual
change theory described above differ in several
ways, including: their role in instruction, the
time scale required for the change, and the
experimental ease of observing any conceptual
change.  Furthermore, from the descriptions
given above, it is clear that the types of
conceptual change are not exclusive.  Wholesale
change might involve incremental changes
leading to dual constructions which eventually
cascade into a single, new construct.  Other
combinations have also been described above.
There may be subtleties involved in how typical
students progress through certain curricula.  In
some cases, such as when learning about
dynamics in a physics class, one may wish to
prevent the creation of dual constructions and
have students use an epistemological stance of
coherence
4, 13
 at all stages in their learning.  In
other cases, such as when learning wave-particle
duality, one may need to insist on building dual
constructions before one can move on to
merging the ideas into a coherent model of
quantum physics.  Similar care might be taken
when considering how to induce incremental or
cascade changes in instruction.
5.  APPLYING RESOURCE
GRAPHS TO OTHER FORMS
OF CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
Having described four types of
conceptual change in terms of resource graphs,
we wish to extend our description to two other
situations.  This section of the paper shows only
two applications of the resource graph
representation as a way of binding together
many different results from physics education
research.  Many other applications are possible.
A.  Describing one form of analogical
reasoning
Analogical reasoning consists of
comparing one situation to another and using the
rules of one situation to guide thinking about
unknown rules in another situation.  For
example, Duit
78
 creates teaching situations in
which analogies are used to create conceptual
change in students reasoning about chaos.  He
finds that appropriate connections between two
systems can help students’ conceptions of an
idea change as they use the analogy to gain new
ideas.  Two elements of Duit’s work lend
themselves very well to a resource graph
representation.
First, we can describe the analogy itself
in terms of resource graph.  We describe the
analogy as a comparison between two very
similar resource graphs.  Some elements are
shared or at least very similar, and the links
between these elements are identical (or nearly
so) in both situations.  One situation, the target
analogy, has a more complete resource graph
than the other.  In applying the analogy, one can
use the more complete resource graph to ascribe
properties and links to resources not yet
associated with the less complete resource
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graph.  In an example not from Duit’s study, one
can consider water flow as a way to model
circuits.  One can think of flow down many
parallel channels as being a shared property of
water flow and electric circuits.  For students
who have not thought about the issue of charge
conservation, the analogy to water flow can act
as a natural guide in reasoning.  Thus, the
“conservation” resource (perhaps thought of as
“nothing gets used up”) can be brought into
reasoning about electric circuits for those
students who had previously thought of current
being “used up.”
Second, we can describe the conceptual
change that is created in analogical reasoning.  It
seems to be an incremental or cascade change.
The change cannot be wholesale because the
analogy remains; the similarity of resource
graphs remaining prevents one of the graphs
from changing in a wholesale fashion.  The
change might be cascade, in that the changes in
resources might be connected together as they
develop due to the analogy.  The result of the
change might be the shift of a dual construction
shifting to a single view of a situation; by
strengthening the analogy, one might help
students stop using one method of thinking
about a situation when they previously had
multiple ways.  Several other possibilities can
also be considered.
In closing, we point out that analogical
reasoning as described from a resource graph
representation is a productive way to use the
language of conceptual blending
26
 in existing
models of physics education research.
B.  A new kind of conceptual change:
Differentiation
We have so far shown that five types of
conceptual change can be described by resource
graphs and are consistent with different kinds of
learning shown in the physics education research
literature.  Rather than describe existing
conceptual change theories in the context of
existing PER results, we can use PER results to
describe a type of conceptual change not yet
discussed in the conceptual change literature.
Rather than creating a dual construction in a
single context, differentiation is the process of
learning to see two situations in what was once a
single context.
We introduce the idea of differentiation
using research by Dewey Dykstra and others on
student learning of kinematics to describe a
process of differentiation between velocity and
acceleration.  To account for findings, we
introduce a representation of differentiation
which we then apply to student learning of
quantum tunneling.  Data are taken from data
gathered at the University of Maine by Morgan,
where students learn to differentiate between
energy and probability in the case of tunneled
particles.
1.  Examples from PER:  Motion is the
conflation of velocity and acceleration
Rather than begin with an idealized
schematic to represent student reasoning, we
first discuss an example from the PER literature
as a way of motivating the need for the idea of
differentiation.  Typically, students enter our
courses conflating the ideas of velocity and
acceleration into a single description of
motion.
21, 22
  Acceleration is only an increase in
velocity; deceleration, a decrease in velocity, is a
different idea.  Dykstra describes that these ideas
are combined into a general concept of motion.
His work goes on to discuss ways of separating
motion into two concepts, velocity and
acceleration.
Supporting evidence for the conflation
of velocity and acceleration in motion comes
from several sources.  Questions on the Force
and Motion Concept Evaluation (FMCE)
61
 allow
researchers to see how students view
acceleration.  On the coin toss question
described earlier in this paper,
50
 some students
say the acceleration of a tossed coin points in the
direction of the velocity on the way up and the
way down, and is zero at the top of the
trajectory.
61, 79
  Pre- and post-instruction data
from the FMCE supports that students move
from a conflated view of motion to a
differentiated view of velocity and acceleration.
Further evidence comes from Shaffer’s work,
80
where students show a confusion in their use of
vectors describing velocity and acceleration.
After targeted instruction, students no longer
confuse the ideas.  Again, they have learned to
differentiate between velocity and acceleration.
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As Dykstra points out, helping students see
motion as two different concepts, velocity and
acceleration, is central to teaching students to
understand force and Newton’s Laws.
21, 22
2.  Representation
To account for differentiation in ideas,
we introduce a simple resources graph that
shows differentiation in the figure below.  We
begin with a relatively large resource graph with
many elements that are only loosely connected
and generally activated by an observation (for
example, the motion of an object).  This graph is
transformed into two distinct resource graphs,
each with its own activation.  The term
differentiation is chosen specifically to describe
the closeness of the two resource graphs and that
one must seek out subtle differences in order to
appropriately differentiate between two related
networks of ideas.
For the moment, we do not distinguish
between types of differentiation in our resource
graph representation, though several might exist.
We give one example below.  Many others exist
but are not discussed here.
3.  Differentiation in quantum tunneling
In work carried out at the UMaine
Physics Education Research Laboratory,
building on work begun at the University of
Maryland,
81, 82
 we have found that students often
think that both energy and probability of finding
a particle are lost when quantum particles tunnel
through a barrier.
83-85
  A typical question
involved students discussing the energy of
particles which tunnel through a finite square
barrier, with the particle energy less than the
height of the barrier.  A large number of students
say that energy is lost by the particles which
have tunneled.  Also, nearly all students
correctly state that there is less probability of
finding a tunneled particle than finding one that
has not tunneled.  We can describe the students
as having one large resource graph, activated by
the observation of a barrier, including such
resources as “maintaining agency,” “dying
away,” “overcoming,” visual markers such as
“height of a graph,” and conceptual markers
such as “number of particles.”  Other resources
can be connected, such as “constant” for the idea
that some things remain constant (perhaps the
energy of the incoming particles) as seen by the
constant wavelength of the particle’s
wavefunction.  The resources of “dying away”
and “overcoming” are applied to both energy
and probability in student reasoning.
84, 86
  Figure
12 shows a typical tunneling scenario with a
square barrier and Figure 13 represents how
students come to differentiate between the
different resource networks.
A large resource graph with
many elements is transformed into two distinct resource graphs,
each with its own activation
activate
activate
activate
FIG. 11:  Differentiation as conceptual change.  A previously connected set of ideas is separated into two
resource graphs each with its own activation.
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FIG. 12:  Typical tunneling problem.  A beam of
particles with energy E0 is incident on a square
barrier of energy U.  Regions I, II, and III are
labels.
In Figure 14, we show an example of a
typical student response when conflating the
different elements of the preliminary resource
graph.  Note that the “visual: height” resource is
used to indicate the lost energy of the particles
that have tunneled; the axis around which the
wave function oscillates is lower than before.
85
Note also the inconsistency in the student’s
sketch: the wave number, k, dependent on
particle energy, is the same in every equation the
student writes, as is the wavelength of the wave
function.  Yet, the student states “[the particles]
in region 3 ‘lost’ energy while tunneling through
the barrier.”  The student sketches the
wavelength as constant, but connects the idea of
energy to the visual cue of the height of the
oscillation axis to the energy of the particle.  His
understanding is best described by the resource
graph on the left of Figure 13, where both
energy and number of particles that tunnel are
connected to “dying away” and “overcoming.”
We have found that students who
correctly learn the physics of quantum tunneling
learn to hold to a constant energy throughout the
entire physical system, shown on the right in
Figure 13.  They must learn to draw wave
functions differently, always oscillating about
the axis.  They can then more easily recognize
that the wavelength (and their mathematical
formalism) already tell them about the energy of
tunneled particles.  The amplitude of the wave
function may shift, but that is consistent with the
assumed decrease.  Something still “dies away,”
after all.  In summary, students learn to
differentiate between previously aligned
resources in order to create two separate
resource graphs, activated by different readout
strategies.
FIG. 14:  Student response to tunneling
question.  A mixture of correct and incorrect
ideas is applied in contradictory fashion.
Differentiation has not yet occurred.
Number
Main-
taining
agency
Dying
away
Over-
coming
Visual:
height
Main-
taining
agency
Dying
away
Over-
coming
Number
Con-
stant
wave-
length
Energy
Con-
stant
wave-
length
Visual:
height
Energy
FIG. 13:  Differentiation when learning quantum tunneling.  A previously connected resource graph is
split into two different graphs, one dealing with energy and one with number of transmitted particles.
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Differentiation as a form of conceptual
change is common in physics learning.
Examples exist when learning motion (velocity
and acceleration), quantum tunneling (energy
and probability), energy and momentum (as
described by Lawson
73
 and O’Brien Pride
74
), and
areas where students have difficulty
differentiating between a quantity and its rate of
change.  Still, it has not been discussed in the
conceptual change literature previously, showing
that the resource graph representation when
applied to physics education research results
leads naturally to extensions of theories into new
areas.
C.  Further applications of resource
graphs
Other examples of conceptual changes
easily represented by resource graphs are also
possible.  We suggest, but do not present
evidence for, changes such as compilation and
re-framing.  We also suggest studies which
would help elucidate the details of cascade
changes as a way of distinguishing between
curricula which teach Newton’s Second or
Newton’s Third Law.
1.  Conceptual change: Compilation as a
process
Compilation might describe how larger
scale concepts come to be as resources combine
fractally into larger, more solidly linked
structures.  Resources combine into such firmly
connected structures that they begin to act as
individual resources (with no functional
individual elements) in larger structures.  In
ongoing work at the University of Maine,
Eleanor Sayre is leading a project to understand
the process by which resources come to be.  She
is studying how fluid ideas become more plastic
and then solid with time, how ideas combine,
and how resource graphs reify into larger
structures.  She has describe a scale of
“plasticity” to account for the different levels of
commitment and duration of knowledge as
students develop new resources.
2.  Conceptual change: Re-framing as a
process
Re-framing might describe how
activations in a resource graph are changed.  By
changing one’s activation of a graph, different
connections might be promoted and
strengthened, leading to nuances in one’s
reasoning about a situation.  In another project at
the University of Maine, Padraic Springuel is
studying how visualization affects student
reasoning about concepts such as kinematics and
integration.  Preliminary results by Thompson
(on which Springuel is building) show that
students re-frame situations using subtle cues to
incorporate resources in one setting that are not
part of another, seemingly identical setting.
87
3.  Understanding differences between
curricula
When introducing Newton’s second law,
one can begin by considering either a single
force or many forces acting on a mass.  The
former causes acceleration, which is difficult for
many students to understand.  The second
requires vector sums, which can be differently
difficult to understand.  Two leading reform-
based curricula approach the problem from each
viewpoint.  In RealTime Physics, students work
with low friction carts and a mass hanging from
a pulley to accelerate a series of differently
massed systems.  They develop Newton’s
Second Law from this single force and only then
move to a description of competing (and
sometimes equal in magnitude) forces.  We can
imagine this process as a cascade change, for
example: starting with the observation of carts
speeding up, “causation” linking the speeding up
to the mass hanging from the pulley, “Ohm’s p-
prim” accounting for the ratio of cart mass to
acceleration, and then “balancing” for
competing forces that happen to be equal.  In the
Tutorials in Introductory Physics, students first
discuss a stationary object on which many forces
are acting.  They learn to distinguish between
contact and non-contact forces, compare systems
in horizontal and vertical systems, and generally
use a static situation to derive the idea of
Newton’s Second Law.  We can imagine this
process as using a very different set of resources,
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for example: including “balancing” from the
very beginning, and incorporating resources
related to Newton’s Third Law much sooner.
The resource graph that is built by the students
might differ substantially from that developed in
RealTime Physics, yet both are correct resource
graphs for describing Newton’s Second Law.
Which is best for students might depend on the
ease with which students link the specific
resources in each form of cascade change.
Other experimental studies can also be
suggested to test how students’ conceptions
change over time.  In preliminary work carried
out by Trevor Smith at the University of Maine,
we have compared three ways of teaching
Newton’s Third Law, using the tutorial by Elby
and Hammer described above,
4, 13
 the University
of Washington Tutorials in Introductory
Physics,
54
 and the MBL-based Activity-Based
Tutorials.
88
 In two years of instruction, we have
found that students using the tutorial developed
by Elby consistently perform significantly better
on a variety of examination and standardized test
results (using the FMCE
61
) in both pushing and
collision situations that require Newton’s Third
Law to be analyzed properly.
89
  At one level, our
data are satisfying, since we can say that for our
institution there is sufficient evidence to show
that one method is more effective than another.
At another level, our result tells us far too little
to help others make adequate instructional
choices.  Without observational classroom data,
we do not know which tutorial best matched
lecture instruction, which questions in the
tutorials were most effective in creating
effective learning in students, or how individual
questions affected students and caused a change
in their understanding.  Describing our results in
detail, using ideas of resource activation and
representations of the resources graphs
developed in each instructional setting, would
strengthen our understanding of the actual
learning processes promoted by each
curriculum.
6.  SUMMARY
We have described several types of
conceptual change using resource graphs to
build a mescoscopic description of linked
resource use.  Our representation of resource-
based reasoning that can account for several
seminal results in the physics education research
literature.  The representation consists of a graph
showing sets of linked resources activated in a
specific context.  Changes to the representation
can involve resources being added or dropped
from the graph, links being dropped or added,
and changes in the activation of a set of linked
resources.  Our data has been connected to
experimental work carried out at many different
institutions over several decades.  Our goal has
been to provide a language that is relatively
simple to access and better matches actual
events in student learning and curriculum
development than either the small scale,
microscopic resources model or the large-scale,
macroscopic misconceptions model.
Using the resource graph representation,
we are able to describe several published forms
of conceptual change and discuss several other
types.  In incremental change, a single resource
is added or dropped from a resource graph while
leaving the rest of the graph largely intact.  In
cascade change, a small change in one area can
cause a large-scale shift in the resource graph as
connected changes cascade through the system.
In dual construction conceptual change, one
builds multiple resource graphs that are
activated in parallel.  Finally, in wholesale
conceptual change, the entire resource graph
changes.  We use our representation to describe
analogical reasoning as a mapping of one
resource graph onto another.  We introduce the
term differentiation to describe the conceptual
change that occurs as students learn to create
two distinct resource graphs out of one large
graph that described closely related ideas.
It is clear that the many types of
conceptual change are not exclusive.  Some of
the conceptual changes described in the
literature are processes, while other describe
differences between states in students minds.
Wholesale change might involve incremental
changes leading to dual constructions which
eventually cascade into a single, new construct.
Other combinations have also been described
above.  There may be subtleties involved in how
typical students progress through certain
curricula.  In some cases, such as when learning
about dynamics in a physics class, one may wish
to prevent the creation of dual constructions and
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have students use an epistemological stance of
coherence
4, 13
 at all stages in their learning.  In
other cases, such as when learning about
conductivity, one may need to insist on building
dual constructions before one can move on to
merging the ideas into a coherent model of
quantum physics.
71
  Similar care might be taken
when considering how to induce incremental or
cascade changes in instruction.
We argue that the resource graph
representation allows a succinct description of
learning on the scale that students experience in
our physics classes.  Students typically struggle
to learn new ideas piece by piece but not entirely
in isolation.  Their learning often comes in
isolated chunks which must be combined into
larger chunks later on.
51
  Many ideas are taught
on the assumption of incremental changes or
cascade changes which build from previous
ideas.  Typically, students address dual
constructions in a specific context such as
Newton’s Second Law, and the results should
not be assumed to be universal as the students
are often not explicitly taught to generalize
results across situations.  At times, we see a
fundamental change in how students think about
an entire topic, but wholesale changes are rare
on the time scales in which we can observe
students and convincingly show that a complete
change in reasoning has occurred.
Our representation does not include
information about how to create the types of
conceptual change in a given form of
instruction.  Incremental changes seem simple
and quick yet can be very difficult to create and
may take a long time to cause in a student.
Cascade changes are often the desired pathway
for building a series of connected steps in
learning a new idea but may be similarly
difficult to create.  Dual constructions may be a
natural (and negative!) way of separating
classroom learning from everyday thinking but
can be induced in the short term through
appropriate activities. Wholesale changes may
or may not involve a period of confusion while
leading to one idea being replaced by another.
Differentiation might be a natural element of
instruction but not made sufficiently clear to the
students.
Other models of reasoning can be
accounted for using the resource graph
representation.  Conceptual dynamics in which
there is a shift from old (typically incorrect or
incomplete) to new (and aligned with experts)
views might be thought of as the time
development of dual constructions leading to a
wholesale change in students.  Specific student
difficulties in which students fail to apply some
element of thinking can be thought of as
incomplete resource graphs, a false application
of a resource graph, or simply a mapping of
what resources are and are not part of the
context-specific resource graph that students
bring to a situation.  Broadly speaking, Piagetian
assimilation can be thought of as incremental
change and Piagetian accommodation can be
thought of as wholesale change.  Analogical
reasoning can be thought of as the comparison
of similar resource graphs, one more advanced
than the other, and one’s use of similarities
between the two to create incremental changes
in the less complete graph.  Finally, our
representation of resource graphs is consistent
with diSessa and Sherin’s coordination classes
model but extends it to mesoscopic grain sizes
for which experimental data can be less
rigorous, changes in reasoning can be more
fleeting, and the structures being described are
much smaller than concepts such as “force”
11
 or
“object.”
25
The resource graph representation not
only accounts for results from the existing
physics education research literature but
suggests new experiments and the need for
additional data sources within existing
experiments.  Creating an appropriate
representation helps us clarify our thinking, seek
new results, refine our experimental work, and
discuss results with a consistent language.  The
resource graph representation, though
incomplete, moves us forward in each of these
directions.
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